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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
KENDALL INSURANCE, INC., and 
SHIRLEY ANN MORGAN, and 
CHARLES MORGAN 
Plaintiffs and Appellees, 
v. 
R&RGROUP,INC.,and 
RICK B. STANZIONE, 
Defendants and Appellants 
APPELLANTS' OPENING BRIEF 
Case#: 20060570 
JURISDICTION 
This appeal is from a civil judgment in the Second District Court, Weber County. 
Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2(j) and later §78-2a-3(j) conferred jurisdiction upon this court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the lower court err as a matter of law by finding that there was a mutual mistake of 
fact as to the value of the business when the Morgans signed an integrated contract 
containing a clause stating that they had made an accounting of the business previous to 
the sale and that they were satisfied with that accounting? 
2. Did the lower court abuse its discretion in making a finding that there was a "mutual 
mistake of fact" when that finding is contrary to the evidence offered at trial? 
3. Did the lower court commit prejudicial error by failing to make findings of fact and 
conclusions of law to dispose of issues addressed in the order to show cause? 
4. Did the lower court err as a matter of law by failing to award Stanzione his attorney's fees 
where the promissory note calls for "all" fees to be reimbursed and where Stanzione 
prevailed on all contractual claims? 
5. Did the lower court improperly deny Appellants' Rule 60(b) motion for relief from 
judgment? 
STATUTORY PROVISION WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 60(B) (complete text in addendum) 
RELATED APPEALS 
Appellants are not aware of any related appeals. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This appeal is from a final civil judgment entered on February 27, 2006; findings of fact and 
conclusions of law were entered concurrently. This appeal is also from a memorandum decision 
filed by the lower court on August 2, 2006 denying a timely filed Rule 60(b) motion. 
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Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
On October 31 and November 1, 2005, the lower court held a bench trial on the instant 
dispute. Trial proceedings were merged with order to show cause issues that were previously heard 
by the lower court (in part) but were not decided previous to trial because many issues that 
remained to be heard overlapped with trial issues. See Trial Transcript, 1. Issues from the Order 
to Show Cause included whether or not the Appellees ("Morgans") should be held in contempt of 
court for failure to comply with the August 9, 2004 order directing them to forward the entire book 
of business to the Appellants ("Stanzione") and whether or not the Morgans should be held in 
contempt of court for attempting to circumvent the intent of the lower court's order by deceptively 
encouraging clients of Kendell Insurance Agency, Inc. or Kendell Insurance LLC ("Kendall 
Insurance") to transfer their insurance policies to a new entity operated, owned, and controlled by 
the Plaintiffs instead of remaining under the control of the Defendants when said client accounts 
were to be forwarded as an asset to the Defendants. Attorney's fees were also requested as a part 
of said order to show cause. See Record Index^ 111-13; 118-23, 133-38. These order to show cause 
issues were repeatedly referred to and addressed during trial (e.g., See Trial Transcript, 16:11-25 -
18:1-11; 19:20-25 - 21:1-20; 22:5-19; 124:17-25). 
At trial, Morgans claimed that Stanzione represented the value of the sale of the book of 
business at issue to be between $850,000 and $1,000,000 while it was in fact worth approximately 
50% of those representations. See Trial Transcript, 7:20-23; 4:40; 7:2. Stanzione responded that 
an accounting of the income from the book of business would show that the business was not only 
represented accurately but that the Morgans had three to four weeks to audit the records and that 
the contract they signed represented that they had an opportunity to audit the records and were 
satisfied with the results and that the sale was "as is". See Trial Transcript, 16:11-18; 15:14-19. 
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Stanzione further claimed that the Morgans failed to abide by a previous order to turn the business 
over to Stanzione by cannibalizing the business by diverting clientele into a newly created entity 
owned by the Morgans and that he suffered damages as a result of these actions. See Trial 
Transcript, 16:19-25. 
In its final order, the lower court declared that Stanzione was the prevailing party, that he 
had control of all of the stocks and assets of Kendall Insurance, that he was entitled to attorneys 
fees in an amount not to exceed $17,500.00, and that he had to return $75,000.00 in payments 
made by the Morgans as a result of a "mutual mistake" made at the time of negotiating said 
contract. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, findings paragraphs 28, 30; conclusions 
paragraphs 2, 4 (included in Addendum, 1-10). 
Stanzione thereafter filed a Rule 60(b) motion requesting relief from the judgment. 
The lower court declined to make any findings regarding the Rule 60(b) motion apart from finding 
that "theie is no reason justifying the relief sought" and if any findings of fact and conclusions of 
law were in erroi "that determination will be made by the higher court." See Memorandum 
Decision dated August 2, 2006 (included in Addendum, 35), 
While Stanzione was not requesting the lower court to correct its findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in the rule 60(b) motion, the findings were at issue because they required the 
"prevailing party" to pay the non-prevailing party substantial sums of money because there were 
no findings of fact and conclusions of law made concerning the order to show cause that should 
have offset any potential liability of the "prevailing party" to pay the non-prevailing part many 
thousands of dollars while at the same time being awarded a then cannibalized business that was 
healthy and viable before the litigation began. The rule 60(b) motion merely requested relief from 
having to pay monies on a judgment because the lower court made an error in not making findings 
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of fact and conclusions of law surrounding the order to show cause issues that demonstrated 
substantial monies lost by the "prevailing party" far exceeded monies that the "prevailing party" 
was ordered to pay to the non-prevailing parties - it did not request any relief in the form of any 
new findings of fact or conclusions of law or by requesting any modification of the judgment. See 
Motion and Memorandum for Relief from Judgment or Order (Record Index, 280-83). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The instant dispute is over a contract for the sale of a business - Kendall Insurance. 
Stanzione sold all of the stock and related assets of Kendall Insurance to the Morgans. Paul 
Nelson, an insurance agent, assisted the Morgans in the negotiation of said contract and said 
contract was signed and entered into on September 1, 2003. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, paragraph 1, 7, 10 (Record Index, 240 et seq.) and Addendum, 18-25. The primary cause 
of action brought by the Morgans at trial was whether or not Stanzione misrepresented the value 
of the business. See Trial Transcript. 7:20-23: 4:40; 7:2. 
In addition to an integration clause/ the contract specifically stated that "Copies of the 
latest information concerning the business activities and financial affairs of Kendell Insurance Inc. 
have been made available to and have been inspected by buyer [Morgans] to its complete and total 
satisfaction incident to which buyer has received the professional advice and expertise of a certified 
public accountant retained by buyer". See Trial Transcript, 135:14-25 - 136:1-8 and Addendum, 
23. Shirley Morgan testified that she agreed to this statement when she signed it. See Trial 
The clause reads "This purchase agreement embodies the entire agreement between seller and buyer and 
will not be modified or terminated except by an agreement in writing." Nevertheless, despite this clause and 
the acknowledgement of an accounting being made to the Morgans' satisfaction in the same contract, the 
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Transcript, 137:6-10.2 She further testified that the Morgans not only had the opportunity to 
modify the contract but that they took advantage of that opportunity and made some changes to 
another portion of the contract. See Trial Transcript 137:21-25 - 138:1-18. Lastly, she testified 
that she was "pretty sure" that her legal counsel looked over the contract on the Morgans' behalf. 
See Trial Transcript 147:16-24. 
At trial, Paul Nelson (witness for the Morgans) testified that Stanzione represented that 
the book of business was worth one million dollars. He further stated that if this value was correct, 
the Morgans would expect to see a monthly income equal to one twelfth often percent of that 
figure. In other words, the Morgans should have expected to see a monthly income equal to ten 
percent of $1,000,000 divided by 12. Simple math shows that this would be a monthly income of 
$8,333.33. See Trial Transcript, 50:13-25 - 51:1-4; 69:8-11. No other witness for the Morgans gave 
any contradicting methodology as to how to compute the value of a book of business or gave any 
information as to any expectations that may have been contrary to this calculation. 
At trial, Stanzione's accountant testified that a review of the Kendall Insurance general 
account showed that Stanzione averaged a gross pre-sale monthly income of $9,761.003 while 
operating Kendall Insurance from approximately March 2002 until August 31, 2003 - a figure 
higher than that expected by Paul Nelson. See Trial Transcript, 274:4 and Addendum, 26. He 
further testified that based upon his review of the same general account, the Morgans averaged a 
gross income of $11,805.00 from September I, 2003 to August 31, 2004 and that there was no 
Morgans' entire case revolved around claims that the value of the business was misrepresented. See Trial 
Transcript440:8-16 and Addendum, 24. 
2
 Ms. Morgan subsequently stated that this information in the contract was inaccurate. See the following 
lines of the transcript. 
3
 Stanzione testified that the net commission income was approximately $7,200.00. See Trial Transcript 
322:5-7. 
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indication of any significant deposits from non-commission sources that would substantially 
change this conclusion - this monthly income is nearly $3,500.00 higher than that expected by 
Paul Nelson.4 See Trial Transcript, 274:15-17 and Addendum, 26. Contrary to the accountant's 
summary of commission income received during the Morgans' control of Kendall Insurance 
{Addendum, 26-27), Ms. Morgan testified that there was "no commissions coming in for a couple of 
months." See Trial Transcript, 16:20. 
After the business was returned to Stanzione, the monthly commission income was reduced 
by approximately 75%. His accountant further testified that Stanzione averaged a gross income of 
$2,358.00 monthly from September 2004 until July of the following year (Stanzione gained partial 
control of Kendall Insurance on or about September 2004). See Trial Transcript, 275:22-24 and 
Addendum, 27. 
Nevertheless, the lower court concluded that a "mutual mistake of fact relating to the value 
and composition of the Kendall Insurance Agency and its book of business existed at the time that 
the sale of the agency was negotiated between Defendants and the Morgans." See Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, paragraph 28. The lower court further found that "commission income [] 
was significantly less than the representations which [Morgans] had received [from Stanzione]." See 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, paragraph 14; Trial Transcript, 113:16-23. 
The lower court found that the Morgans paid to Stanzione and/or the Kendall Insurance an amount 
exceeding $10,300.00 and while this fact was not specifically connected to the value of the business, it seems 
reasonable to infer that the lower court was finding that the $11,805.00 monthly commission income figure 
should have been reduced by approximately $10,300.00 a year or $858.33 a month - this suggests that the 
lower judge was accepting additional testimony of Stanzione's accountant in regards to this issue {Trial 
Transcript, 276:19-25 - 277:1 and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, paragraph 29) and/or the court 
could have been relying on Ms. Morgan's testimony {Trial Transcript, 113:16-23 and/or Plaintiffs7Exhibit 
100, Tabs 14-15. 
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The Morgans operated the Kendall Insurance for several months. During that time, 
Shirley Ann Morgan was to operate the business but she was not competent to manage or 
supervise the business activities. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, paragraphs 8-9. 
However, it was only three months following the sale when the Morgans and Paul Nelson began 
alleging that the commission income (represented by monies received into the general account) was 
significantly less than the representations they had been given by Stanzione. See Trial Transcript, 
51:5-11; 128:19-25 -129:1-20; but see 161:24-25 - 162:1-3. Other allegations were made about the 
representations of the number of active clients identified as part of the book of business of Kendall 
Insurance. See Trial Transcript, 48:11-25 - 49:1-10. Consequently, the Morgans requested a 
reformation of said contract. See Trial Transcript, 128:20-25 - 129:1-2; 130:14-18. Stanzione 
refused to reform the contract and in December 2003, he demanded full performance under said 
contract and payment in full. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, paragraph 16. The 
Morgans did not make any further payments under the contract. See Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, paragraph 15. Subsequently, the Morgans filed the instant action. 
After various disputes over the ownership of Kendall Insurance, Stanzione motioned the 
lower court to order the Morgans to return control of the Kendall Insurance book of business to 
Stanzione. An order directing the return of Kendal Insurance to Stanzione was entered on August 
9, 2004. See Addendum, 35. Subsequently, Stanzione filed an order to show cause alleging that 
the Morgans did not return the entire book of business and that the Morgans had engaged in 
fraudulent and illicit business practice to disassociate a substantial majority of profitable clients 
from Kendall Insurance before returning the book of business to Stanzione. The order to show 
cause requested a finding of contempt and reimbursement for various damages incurred as a result 
of the Morgans' actions. See Record Index, 111-13; 118-23; 133-38. The lower court merged the 
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order to show issues with the trial issues and all issues were presented, defended, and pursued at 
trial. See Trial Transcript, 1. However, the lower court made no findings concerning whether or 
not the Morgans failed to timely or substantially abide by the August 9, 2004 order or whether or 
not they engaged in illicit business practices (and thereby circumvented the purposes of said order) 
by diverting Kendall Insurance policies into another ent i ty owned by the Morgans before turning 
the business over to Stanzione. Fur ther , the lower court did not make any findings addressing the 
damage issues raised by Stanzione in the order to show cause. 
Lastly, the lower court awarded attorney's fees to the "prevailing par ty" but capped those 
fees at $17,500.00 without offering any rationale or justification when the promissory note itself 
allows for "all" fees to be rewarded to the prevailing par ty . See Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, 30; Addendum, 25.5 
SUMMARY OF A R G U M E N T 
The lower court improperly found that there was a "mutual mistake" as to the value of the 
business because the apparent findings of the lower court were tha t the monthly commission of the 
Morgans was approximately $11,000.00 (as explained in footnote 4 above) and, when considered in 
conjunction with all other evidence introduced at trial, these findings can only be read to 
demonstrate tha t the Morgans were making monthly commission income in excess of what they 
should have expected to receive were the business to be valued in accordance with their own 
testimony and the testimony of their own witness - if all of the evidence delineated in the findings 
5
 Although no exact figure was offered to the court, Stanzione's current counsel's fees were approximately 
$17,500.00 immediately after the trial but Stanzione had incurred many thousands of dollars in attorney's 
fees previous to that time and no explanation was given as to why those fees would be considered 
"unreasonable" (See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, paragraph 30). 
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of fact were construed in favor of the Morgans and if the remaining evidence is considered, this 
figure would be about $3,000.00 a month more than the Morgans claimed that they would have 
expected to receive. 
Even if there was a "mutual mistake" as to the value of the business in question, the lower 
court improperly rescinded the contract in dispute based upon a "mutual mistake" because the 
contract in question contained both an integration clause and an "as is" clause and because there 
was no finding of affirmative or positive fraud justifying a rescission of the contract. 
The lower court improperly failed to make findings of fact and conclusions of law 
concerning the order to show cause that was merged with the trial proceedings and the lower court 
improperly failed to make any findings of fact justifying a cap on the prevailing parties' attorney's 
fees because the contract calls for "all" fees to be reimbursed. 
Lastly, the lower court improperly denied Stanzione's Rule 60(b) motion because it failed 
to understand that Stanzione was not requesting an amended judgment or amended findings of 
fact and conclusions of law - Stanzione was merely requesting a relief from the judgment as 
allowed by the rule and his motion should have been considered on its merits. 
ARGUMENT 
Did the lower court err as a matter of law by finding that there was a mutual mistake of 
fact as to the value of the business when the Morgans signed an integrated contract 
containing a clause stating that they had made an accounting of the business previous to 
the sale and that they were satisfied with that accounting? 
Appellate courts in Utah should grant no deference to questions of law reached by lower 
courts. Scharfv. BMG Corp. 700, P. 2d 1068 (Utah, 1985); Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 P. 2d 
1127 (Utah 1990^; The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that matters of law are 
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specifically applied to the interpretation and review of contracts. Nova Cas. Co. v. Able Const., 
Inc., 983P.2d 575 (Utah 1999/ 
In the instant case, the contract in question has an integration clause and states in plain 
language that the Morgans had "[cjopies of the latest information concerning the business 
activities and financial affairs of Kendell Insurance Agency, Inc." and that these records were 
"made available to and [were] inspected by [the Morgans] to [theii] complete and total satisfaction 
incident to which [the Morgans] received the professional advise and expertise of a certified public 
accountant retained by [the Morgans]." Emphasis added. See Addendum, 23. Accordingly, the 
question as to whether or not the business was inaccurately represented to the Morgans by 
Stanzione should not have been entertained by the court unless there was an accusation of 
affirmative and positive fraud. Maack v. Resource Design & Const., Inc., 875 P.2d 570, Utah App., 
1994 citing Kaye v. Buehrle, 8 Ohio App. 3d 381, 457 N.E.2d 373, 376 (1983) (holding that "as is" 
clause bars claim for fraudulent nondisclosure but permits claim for "positive" fraud). 
As a matter of public policy, the Maack rule is a good one because parties should retain 
control of their contractual bargains; when a party signs their name to an agreement containing an 
"as is" clause designed to prevent future litigation over the value of a business (and the clause in 
the instant contract appears to be designed for that exact purpose), courts should not entertain 
subsequent complaints claiming that the statements in the contract are untrue (that their C.P.A. 
inspected copies of all of the latest business records to their complete and total satisfaction) unless 
a party is accused of affirmative or positive fraud that would justify relieving a party from being 
bound to an inequitable contract. 
In the instant case, the Morgans did claim reckless or intentional misrepresentation of the 
contract under their initial complaint - however, the lower court made a finding that directly 
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precluded any reckless or intentional misrepresentation when it determined that there was a 
mutual mistake. Accordingly, since a "mutual mistake" does not satisfy the standard of an 
affirmative and/or positive fraud as articulated under Maack, this Court should reverse the lower 
court's order rescinding the contract based upon a finding of a "mutual mistake". See Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, Conclusion paragraph 1. Further^ this Court should grant 
Stanzione's request for relief below by enforcing the contractual terms requiring the Morgans to 
finish making payments for Kendall Insurance and by requiring Stanzione to return Kendall 
Insurance to the Morgans. 
Did the lower court abuse its discretion in making a finding that there was a "mutual 
mistake of fact" when that finding is contrary to the evidence offered at trial? 
Appellate courts have long held that challenges to factual findings made by lower courts 
are reviewed at the very high bar of an abuse of discretion standard. State v. All Real Property, 37 
P.2d 276 (2001)(discretion of adopting findings is within the discretion of the court as long as the 
findings are not clearly contrary to the evidence). 
As outlined in the statement of facts above, the only evidence before the lower court 
concerning the valuation of the business came from Paul Nelson's testimony and he testified that a 
million dollar book of business should genemte about $8,000.00 in monthly commissions. In the 
instant case, the general account statements were all entered into evidence and were summarized 
by Stanzione's accountant (Addendum, 26-27). This accounting demonstrated that the business 
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was actually generating $9,761.00 previous to the sale to the Morgans and demonstrated tha t the 
business generated $11,805.00 under the Morgans control of the business. Again, even if the lower 
court was intending to find tha t the monthly commission figure under the Morgans control should 
have been reduced by the $10,300.00 figure ($858.33 monthly) cited in its findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, the monthly income was still well over the figure predicted by the Morgans' 
witness - the same witness t h a t was advising them as to whether or not they should purchase the 
business under the contract in dispute. While Ms. Morgan did testify tha t there were a couple of 
months where no commission was received at all, the general bank account records and the 
summary of those records by the accountant demonstrate that this s ta tement was simply not t rue 
and not justifiable.7 Fur ther , even if this statement were true, the average monthly income 
remained higher than the income predicted by Paul Nelson.8 Therefore, there is simply nothing 
substantial in the record tha t would justify a finding tha t there was a "mutual mistake" as to the 
b
 Counsel for Morgans noted that some of the monies in the pre-sale transfer would have included broker fees 
that the Morgans did not feel comfortable charging their clients (their was a dispute below that is not before 
this Court as to whether or not these fees are legal and/or ethical). See Trial Transcript, 416:18-25 - 417:1-2. 
However, these broker fees were not included in the Morgans' monthly income. Id. Counsel further argued 
that these numbers could have significantly reduced the monthly income potential of the business. See Trial 
Transcript, 417:3-25-418:1-5. The fact that Stanzione's accountant and three other witnesses testified that 
broker fees were a minimal portion of the commissions (less than 1%; See Trial Transcript, 436:5-25 - 437:1-
3) is almost irrelevant because, as noted above, the Morgans were making over $3,000 a month more than 
their witness expected that they should make if the business was really worth what Stanzione said it was -
the fact that Stanzione's lesser monthly income may have included other fees is entirely irrelevant. 
The accountant testified that some deposits may have been transfers from personal funds but determined 
that those transfers would have been limited to about $10,000.00 and that the largest monthly series of 
deposits of this nature was around $3,000.00 - a figure that would prohibit the possibility that there was ever 
more than one month of income that fit the description of Ms. Morgan's testimony. Trial Transcript^ 276:19-
25-277:1 
8
 If Paul Nelson's method of valuing the business (monthly income X 12 X 10) is correct, the business under 
the Morgans' tenure [adjusting for the lower court's apparent finding] is $1,313,600.40) - and it is worth 
noting that this was under the supervision of Ms. Morgan whom the lower court found was incompetent to 
run the business. 
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value of the business at the time the parties signed the contract and this Court should reverse the 
lower court's finding of fact on this issue. 
Did the lower court commit prejudicial error by failing to make findings of fact and 
conclusions of law to dispose of issues addressed in the order to show cause? 
Appellate courts in Utah have found that the failure of lower courts to make findings of fact 
and conclusions of law on all issues raised in the proceedings below is prejudicial error subject to 
remand. Huber v. Newman, 1944, 145P.2d 780. (Trial court must make findings on all issues 
raised by the pleadings and evidence.)] Baird v. Upper CanalIrr. Co., 1927, 257P. 1060. (In 
contested cases, court must find on all material issues submitted'unless findings are waived.); 
Boyer Co. v. Lignell, 1977, 567P.2d 1112. (It is the duty of the trial judge in contested cases to find 
facts upon all material issues submitted for decision unless findings are waived. See also State v. 
All Real Property 2001, 37 P.3d 276); Silliman v. Powell 1982, 642 P2d 388 /As the determiner 
of fact, trial court is required to make findings on all material issues. See also Quagliana v. 
Exquisite Home Builders, Inc., 1975, 538 P.2d 301; Sorenson v. Beers, 1980, 614 P.2d 159. (Trial 
court must make findings on all material factual issues raised by evidence. cfRule 15b. See also 
Thomas v. Clayton Piano Co., 1915.); Parish v. Parish, 1934, 35 P.2d 999. (Trial court need not 
follow language of pleadings in fact findings, but findings should be made on every material issue 
presented)', OfGorman v. Utah Realty & Construction Co., 1942, 102 Utah 523, 129 P.2d 981, 
modified 102 Utah 534, 133 P.2d 318. (A direct issue of a specific material fact requires a finding on 
that issue and there must be a finding on all material issues.)\_Duncan v. Hemmelwright, 1947, 112 
Utah 262, 186 P.2d 965. ^Failure to make findings a fact on material issues is error, and ordinarily 
prejudicial.). See also General Ins. Co. of America v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp., 545 P.2d 502, 506 
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(Utah 1976) (trial of an issue by implicit consent allows an issue to be t reated as if it was raised in 
the pleadings). 
None of the issues raised by the order to show cause were addressed by the lower court in 
its findings of fact and conclusions of law. Specifically, there is no finding as to whether or not the 
Morgans failed to comply with the lower court 's order to forward the entire book of business to 
Stanzione or whether or not the Morgans at tempted to circumvent the intent of the lower court 's 
order by deceptively encouraging clients of the business to transfer their policies to an entity 
owned and controlled by the Morgans. While Morgans are likely to argue tha t the lower court did 
make some findings suggestingthat there was a mutual fault of the parties tha t prevented the 
Morgans from forwarding the entire book of business to Stanzione, there is nothing clear in the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law tha t states that this was the lower court 's finding and 
further, there is absolutely nothing in the lower court's findings tha t remotely hints at whether or 
not the Morgans were a t tempting to deceive Kendall Insurance clients to transfer their policies to 
an entity owned and controlled by the Morgans - a primary issue of the order to show cause.9 
Further , there is nothing in the lower court 's findings that addresses whether or not the Morgans 
are liable for any of the damages Stanzione claimed to suffer as a result of these alleged actions by 
the Morgans. 
9
 That this issue was a primary issue at trial is evidenced by the fact that counsel for Stanzione summarized 
the evidence and testimony given on this issue on pages 449-456 of the Trial Transcript - approximately half 
of his closing argument. See Trial Transcript, 432-456. Apart from dozens of places on the record where this 
issue is addressed by both parties, this issue was also the primary thrust behind Ben Opheikens {Trial 
Transcript, 176-198) and Darlene Stain [Trial Transcript, 199-216) being called to testify before the lower 
court. These witnesses were policy holders who were confused by the Morgans' efforts to transfer their 
policies away from Kendall Insurance (and into the Morgans' other business) and who alleged deceptive 
practices by the Morgans as part of the Morgans' effort to move business away from Kendall Insurance 
before returning the book of business to Stanzione as per the lower court's order. 
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The important factor to this question before this Court is whether or not the lower court's 
failure to address these issues in the findings of fact and conclusions of law resulted in any 
prejudice to Stanzione. The answer to that is evident from the harsh effects of the final judgment 
and is succinctly summarized in two lines of the trial transcript: Stanzione requested a minimum of 
$111,000.00 in damages for lost revenue10 as a result of the Morgan's failure to abide by the order 
to show cause. See Trial Transcript 455:18-19. 
Did the lower court err as a matter of law by failing to award Stanzione his attorney's fees 
where the promissory note calls for "all" fees to be reimbursed and where Stanzione 
prevailed on all contractual claims? 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that lower courts have the discretion to limit a 
contractual award of attorneys fees when the prevailing party did not prevail on all major causes of 
action. Fullmer v. Blood, 546 P.2d 606, (Utah 1976); see also Jenkins v. Bailey, 676 P.2d 391 
(Utah 1984); but see Cobabe v. Crawford, 780 P.2d 834, 836 (Utah App. 1989)("Couits have, in 
extraordinary situations, declined to award attorney fees to a prevailing party in spite of an 
enforceable contractual provision" - fn 3 [citing cases where forfeituie was invoked, where the 
prevailing party refused two generous offers of settlement, and where both parties acted 
improperly]). Accordingly, the question before this Court is whether or not the lower court abused 
its discretion in not awarding Stanzione his attorney's fees when the lower court found that he was 
the prevailing party as to all contractual causes of action and when there is nothing in the lower 
court's findings of fact and conclusions of law that suggests that there was any extraordinary 
situation justifying a refusal to grant Stanzione his full attorney's fees under the contract. Cobabe 
10
 This figure only represented lost revenue up until the date of trial and was a request additional to his 
prayer for relief to enforce the contract. 
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suggests that the lower court did not abuse its discretion if it found there was an "extraordinary 
situation" that would justify it in declining to award Stanzione his full attorneys fees. However, 
such a finding does not exist in the instant case. Although this Court could find that the lower 
court determined that both parties "acted improperly" after reviewing its findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, this Court should note that all of these actions were in reference to the issues 
raised in the order to show cause and had nothing to do with the causes of action raised in the 
complaint, which is the determining document as to the award of attorney's fees. Further, there is 
nothing in the lower court's findings of fact and conclusions of law stating that the award was 
reduced because of the order to show cause issues. In fact, the award seems to be limited to 
Stanzione's current counsel's fees at the time of trial (see footnote 5 above) and those fees included 
the order to show cause issues - the fees that the lower court failed to award were incurred under 
previous counsel and none of those fees were related to the order to show cause (which was filed by 
current counsel). It appears therefore that the lower court's award of attorney's fees was either 
capped without justification or the lower court intended to make a full award of attorney's fees but 
made a simple administrative error by not noticing that Stanzione had incurred attorney's fees 
that were not entirely a part of his current counsel's fees. 
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the lower court's award of attorney's fees and grant 
Stanzione his entire attorney's fees as established by affidavit and under the relevant rules of civil 
procedure. 
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Did the lower court improperly deny Appellants' Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment? 
If this Court grants Stanzione's requests to reverse the lower court's order for either of the 
issues dealing with the "mutual mistake" above, this portion of the appeal will most likely be 
rendered moot. Therefore, this issue is presented in the alternative and as follows: 
Appellate courts in Utah should grant no deference to questions of law reached by lower 
courts. Scharfv. BMG Corp. 700, P.2d 1068 fUtah, 1985^; Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 
1127 (Utah 1990/ Interpretation of rules is clearly a matter of law. Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure provides that: 
"On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect ... or (6) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." 
In the instant case, Stanzione filed a Rule 60(b) motion requesting relief from the judgment 
because the lower court's failure to make findings of fact and conclusions of law surrounding the 
order to show cause issues resulted in Stanzione being inequitably burdened by an order to repay 
the Morgans their initial deposit of $75,000.00 under the contract while losing at least $110,000.00 
of commission income and being awarded only a portion of his attorney's fees and a cannibalized 
business worth only about 25% of what it was worth previous to the sale to the Morgans. 
Had the lower court declared Stanzione the non-prevailing party, a Rule 60(b) motion 
probably would not have had any merit worth the lower court's consideration. However, 
Stanzione was declared the "prevailing party" under the contractual causes of action but was dealt 
a very inequitable result by the lower court under its "equitable" rescission of contract theory. 
Stanzione's Rule 60(b) motion simply claimed that since the lower court failed to make findings of 
fact and conclusions of law surrounding the order to show cause issues (and thereby ignored his 
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request for $110,000.00 in lost revenue), and since the lower court failed to award Stanzione all of 
his attorney's fees, and since the lower court awarded him a gutted business worth only a fraction 
of its value before the contract was entered into, and since Stanzione was also required to pay the 
Morgans $75,000.00, the judgment was unjust in such a way as to satisfy subsection 6 of Rule 60(b) 
and that this inequitable result was the result of the lower court's mistake under subsection 1 of 
Rule 60(b). His request for relief was not to remedy or reverse all of the other inequitable results 
he suffered below. The only relief he requested under the Rule 60(b) motion was to be relieved 
from paying the judgment Stanzione now has against him - the prevailing party. 
Unfortunately for Stanzione, the lower court apparently understood this motion to be a 
request for new or additional findings of fact and conclusions of law because it responded by stating 
that "[i]f those findings and conclusions are in error, that determination will be made by the higher 
court." See Addendum, 35. The lower court's confusion is somewhat understandable in light of 
the fact that the Rule 60(b) motion necessarily addressed case law identifying the lower court's 
failure to make any findings of fact and conclusions of law as prejudicial error (hence the mistake 
under subsection 1 of Rule 60(b)) and claimed that this mistake justified relief from the judgment. 
However, as argued above, Stanzione's request for relief was meritorious and ought to have been 
granted. As it stands, the "prevailing party" lost his bargain (approximately $220,000.00 plus 
interest remains unpaid under the contract), he lost 75% of the value of his business under an 
"equitable" rescission of contract order, he lost approximately $10,000.00 in attorney's fees that 
were not awarded to him as per contractual terms, he lost $110,000 in revenue, and he was ordered 
to pay $75,000.00 back to the losing party who agreed that they were completely and totally 
satisfied with their accounting of the business records before they signed the contract in the first 
place. 
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Stanzione's Rule 60(b) motion was meritorious and should have been considered by the 
lower court. The lower court was apparently confused by the issues presented in Stanzione's 
motion and thereby failed to consider it on its merits. Accordingly, this Court should reverse the 
lower court's Memorandum Decision and should remand the case for further decision. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the above and foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse and remand the lower court's 
final order, grant Stanzione his prayer for relief by enforcing the contractual terms as they stood 
previous to the filing of the complaint, and remand the case for further proceedings so that the 
lower court can determine whether or not Stanzione is entitled to further relief under his order to 
show cause issues presented and to determine the amount of Stanzione's attorney's fees. In 
addition or in the alternative, this Court should reverse the lower court's Memorandum Decision 
and remand this case for the lower court's consideration of Stanzione's Rule 60(b) motion. 
vJDrea-Brin^y^J2o«iisel for Appellants 
DATE: November 23, 2006 / 
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